This article explores the link between gravity and welfare frameworks for measuring the impact of non-tariff measures. First, an analytical approach suggests how to combine a gravity equation with a partial equilibrium model to determine the welfare impact of non-tariff measures. Second, an empirical application focuses on the effects of a standard capping antibiotic residues in crustaceans in the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan. While the econometric estimation of the gravity equation reports a negative impact on imports, welfare evaluations show that, in most cases, a stricter standard leads to an increase in both domestic and international welfare.
1 The problem of NTMs is potentially pervasive with issues linked to sanitary crises in the agribusiness sector, market authorizations for genetically modified organisms, nanotechnologies or animal cloning, but also issues such as animal welfare, absence of recombinant bovine somatotropin, absence of antibiotic and pesticide residues, absence of child labour in some products from poor countries or carbon emissions linked to products.
The effects of NTMs are ambiguous and politically sensitive. On one side, regulations are often necessary to alleviate market failures, but on the other side, domestic regulations may be imposed simply to impede imports of foreign competitors (Beghin 2008) . Theoretical analyses do not give any definitive conclusions on the overall effect linked to regulation, which requires economists to turn to empirical analyses. Evaluating impacts of such NTMs is not simple and requires tricky estimations (Dee and Ferrantino 2005) .
In this article, we show how to take into account the coefficient measuring the forgone trade linked to NTMs in a gravity equation to determine the relative variations of both price and quantity in a partial equilibrium model used for welfare analysis, with the integration of experimental results to evaluate the damage for consumers.
The related application measures the impact of a stricter standard to cap residues of chloramphenicol in crustaceans. Chloramphenicol is an antibiotic often used in seafood farms in developing countries and is toxic to human health. The estimation of the coefficient measuring the forgone trade via the gravity equation is integrated in a partial equilibrium model, calibrated to represent supplies of and demands for crustaceans in the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan. This calibrated model allows us to measure the impact of the stricter standard on both foreign exporters' profits and domestic welfare defined as the sum of domestic producers' profits and consumers' surplus. While the econometric estimation of the gravity equation shows a negative impact of the standard on crustacean imports, welfare evaluations show that, in most cases, a stricter standard has led to an increase in both domestic and international welfare over the last decade because of a significant reduction in the chloramphenicol damage. In other words, NTMs can be trade-restricting but welfare-enhancing.
Our article makes an important contribution to the literature on NTMs by bridging the gap between mercantilist and welfare approaches. Many recent empirical assessments of NTMs have been mercantilist focusing on forgone trade via gravity estimation (see for example Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 2001a and b; Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni 2008; Anders and Caswell 2009) . However, such an approach is restrictive and hampers a more complete understanding of the actual effects of NTMs on all economic agents concerned (e.g.
producers but also consumers, importers and governments). Other papers aim at developing a welfare approach of NTMs without gravity estimations (e.g. Dean 1995; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina 1998; Paarlberg and Lee 1998; Beghin and Bureau 2001; Warr 2001; McCorriston and MacLaren 2005 and 2007; Wilson and Anton 2006; Yue, Beghin, and Jensen 2006; Pendell et al. 2007 ; Peterson and Orden 2008; Yue and Beghin 2009) . The combination of both gravity and welfare methodologies in a partial equilibrium context has been completely overlooked by these studies and our article explicitly aims to remedy this absence.
A second contribution of our article is to provide up-to-date estimates in terms of gravity equation estimation technology and to account for the impact of NTMs on both the probability that trade takes place (extensive margin) and the intensity of trade (intensive margin) by computing the full marginal effect.
The third contribution of our article is to estimate the welfare variations caused by a stricter standard for crustaceans in the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan. This application is important since the welfare measures taking into account agents' surpluses justify the tightening of standards on imported crustaceans. Our approach differs from the previous seafood studies focusing only on the ex post evaluation of past measures on trade via econometric analysis (Hudson et al. 2003; Debaere 2005; Alberini et al. 2008; Anders and Caswell 2009) . In this article, we evaluate past policies (over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] but also a future policy with an ex ante analysis linked to a potential standard eliminating all chloramphenicol residues in seafood. Such a policy could be selected over the coming years (Ababouch, Gandini, and Ryder 2005; Buzby, Unnevehr, and Roberts 2008) . The welfare study helps anticipate future price adjustments on markets and achieves quantified analyses directly usable by the public decision-maker.
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents both mercantilist and welfare approaches and their potential link from a theoretical point of view. The empirical application on crustacean products is provided in the third section. The last section concludes.
A simple framework
We briefly present both gravity and welfare approaches and their potential links by focusing on the impact of the standard.
The gravity approach
The trade effects of a NTM can be estimated by using a gravity Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the standard new trade monopolistic competition-constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand-Iceberg costs model introduced by Krugman (1980) . Producers in each country operate under increasing returns to scale and produce differentiated varieties. These varieties are shipped with a cost to consumers in all countries. Following Redding and Venables (2004) , the total value of exports from country i to country j can be written as follows:
(1) The Heckman approach allows investigation of the impact of a non-tariff measure on both probability of trade (extensive margin) and amount of trade (intensive margin). To do so, one should compute the full marginal effect, which is the sum of the effects of the NTM on the extensive margin (likelihood to trade) and on the intensive margin (conditional on trade taking place). If the NTM has no significant impact on the extensive and on the intensive margins of trade, no further welfare analysis of the NTM will be necessary. If one of the effects is statistically significant (at least on one margin), it will be used for the welfare analysis linked to NTM. If both effects are significant, their sum will be used.
By taking the derivative from (2) and by abstracting from indexes, the relative variation of exports in value linked to NTM can be defined as (2) is defined by . x p q = , where p and q are respectively the price and the quantity of exports. Thus, the relative variation of exports linked to the NTM can be rewritten as:
When the impact of the NTM is statistically significant, the gravity analysis can be integrated into a calibrated model via equation (3) that isolates the effect of the NTM variation from other effects. This measure provides precious information in a context where data linked to border inspections are extremely difficult to collect. As Ababouch, Gandini, and Ryder (2005, p. iii) mentioned in the introduction of an exhaustive study about border cases, their study "took over three years to finalize in its present form. A major difficulty was accessing essential data and in a format useful for their exploitation." Equation (3) can be applied uniformly across different importing countries for the welfare analysis. 5 The following welfare analysis focuses on NTM impacts for a single country and its importers.
The welfare approach
The welfare measure takes into account agents' surpluses for evaluating a NTM. In a simplified framework, the market good being analyzed is assumed to be homogenous (i.e., same quality attributes) except for a specific characteristic that is potentially dangerous to consumers and linked to the foreign products. Therefore, only foreign producers are concerned by a standard reinforcement selected by the domestic regulator for reducing consumers' risk. This analytical simplification allows a sharper focus on the international implications of standards and particularly fits the empirical example of the next section. Demands are derived from quadratic preferences, and supply is derived from a quadratic cost function.
It is assumed that a representative consumer has the following utility function (Polinsky and Rogerson 1983) :
where f q and d q are the respective consumptions of foreign and domestic products. The parameters , 0 a b > allow the capture of the immediate satisfaction from consuming foreign and domestic products and w is the numeraire good. The parameter θ measures the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic products, with θ = 0 for independent products and θ = 1 for perfect substitutes.
The expected damage linked to the foreign products is captured by the term
For the rest of the article, we focus on the situation where the damage is not internalized (with I=0), which is realistic for the situation presented in the following section (the internalized case with I=1 would directly impact the demand). To simplify the presentation and because of the lack of data in the forthcoming example, we consider domestic and foreign goods as perfect substitutes with θ = 1. The maximization of (4) For the rest of the study and for the sake of simplicity, we only focus on the first effect (i), namely the reduction of the proportion of foreign products entering the market. However, note that both explanations (i) and (ii) lead to similar impacts since they contribute to reducing the quantities supplied by farmers and tend to increase the resulting equilibrium prices.
We focus on a representative foreign producer subsuming all producers.
7 This representative foreign producer maximizes its profit:
where , f f c g are the variable cost parameters and f K is the sunk cost linked amongst others to the firm's market entry and compliance with regulations (for the rest of the presentation, f K is zero only for the sake of simplicity). The parameter λ is the proportion of foreign products entering the domestic market when an output f q is offered before the border inspection. This proportion 0 1 λ ≤ ≤ depends on the standard and the inspection policy. Under the assumption of rational expectations, the expected proportion taken into account by the producer corresponds to the effective proportion linked to the policy. The more stringent the standard and the inspection policy, the lower the proportion of products entering the market. The parameter t is the advalorem tariff on imports, implying a price /(1 ) p t + received by the foreign producers when domestic consumers pay p. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that t=0.
The representative producer maximizes its profits with respect to f q leading to a foreign supply before the inspection equal to
. After the inspection, the foreign supply of products entering the domestic market is
The foreign inverse supply of products entering the domestic market is
Using similar notations to equation (5), the representative domestic producer maximizes the profit given by and the inverse supply is
The total supply defined by the sum of foreign and domestic supply is With this initial situation preceding a reinforcement of the regulation, parameters of the model are initially calibrated in such a way as to replicate prices and quantities over a period.
With the observed quantity Q sold over a period, the average price p observed over the period, and the direct price elasticity $
p dQ Q dp = ⋅ ⋅ ) obtained from econometric estimates, the calibration leads to estimated values for the demand equal to
(the same method can be used for the supply side with a given proportion λ ). The value of r can be provided by experimental studies or by consumers' surveys.
When a standard is reinforced, the market allocation is modified as represented in figure 1 with bold curves and point B. First, a stringent policy increases border cases and consignments of tainted food (Ababouch, Gandini, and Ryder 2005) , which reduces the proportion of entering the domestic market from λ to λ for foreign producers. The supply shifts upward from (S) to (S') leading to an equilibrium price International welfare is the sum of domestic welfare and foreign producers' profits and is given by area ( 0( ) The change in the probability of having contaminated products, from γ to γ , can be exogenously given or measured by studying the border inspection policy when the information is available. When the coefficient 5 β is statistically significant, equation (3) coming from the gravity equation can be used with this welfare analysis to measure the price/quantity effects linked to the stricter standard influencing the imports of foreign products with a change of the parameter λ to λ . With the notation of figure 1, and by focusing on discrete variations with NTM ∆ measuring the stricter-standard impact, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
For a given value λ linked to the equilibrium A, the value of λ is determined by solving (6).
8 This value λ depends on the gravity coefficient 5 β of equation (2) and provides a measure of trade restrictions and welfare impacts.
This link between the gravity and welfare approaches was overlooked by the previous literature and allows us to turn to the empirical estimation linked to the crustacean market.
The Crustacean Example
Production and trade of crustacean products 9 have seen a significant rise over the last decade, 
The gravity estimation
The data used to estimate (2) with the crustacean case are now presented. (Rauch 1999) . As expected, the standard on chloramphenicol has a positive impact on trade (significant with p = 0.07). In other words, the lower the MRL allowed by the importing country, the lower the imports.
However, these results are potentially biased, since they are based only on positive trade flows.
Model (2) The amount of trade is much more impacted by distance than the probability of trade.
Results for the trade equation also show that this amount is positively and significantly influenced by contiguity and colonial links. MRL also has a positive and significant effect on the amount of trade (p = 0.07). This latter result suggests that the reinforcement of the standard between 2001 and 2006 (corresponding to a MRL decrease) had a negative impact on the amount of crustacean imports. In the next subsection, we will use the marginal effect of the standard on trade to estimate the welfare effect of past and future decisions regarding the acceptable levels of chloramphenicol residues. Since the MRL variable has no significant impact on the probability of trade (selection equation), we will just consider the marginal effect of the MRL factor on the amount of trade (0.13, see last column of table 1) for the welfare analysis.
The welfare estimation
Standards that cap chloramphenicol residues have an impact on welfare, since the resulting foreign-supply shift influences both equilibrium price and cost of ignorance (see figure 1) . By integrating the estimated-marginal effect of the MRL on the amount of trade in the calibrated model, it is possible to assess the costs and benefits of a stricter standard. The framework of the previous section based on equations (4) and (5) , it is assumed that the initial probability of contamination is γ =1 (see equation (4)) and the initial proportion of foreign products entering the domestic market is λ =1 (see equation (5)). Table 2 details the parameters used for calibrating the baseline scenario represented by the situation A in figure 1.
Insert table 2 here
The value of the per-unit damage, r , defined in equation (4), is determined by using results from Lusk, Norwood, and Pruitt (2006) characterized by ∆MRL, we distinguish between case 1 with a probability of contamination γ =3/4, and case 2 with a probability γ =1/2.
Insert table 3 here
For each country, table 3 presents the variation in domestic consumers' surplus (including the cost of ignorance linked to the damage), the variation in domestic producers' profits, the variation in foreign producers' profits and the relative variation in international welfare, which includes both domestic welfare and foreign producers' profits. The difference between cases 1 and 2 only concerns the cost of ignorance that does not impact the price, which explains the similar variations in profits in both columns for domestic and foreign producers.
For the United States, Canada and the European Union, table 3 shows that the domestic welfare variation is always positive (domestic welfare includes producers' and consumers' surpluses). Domestic consumers benefit from the reduction in the cost of ignorance that outweighs the negative effects coming from the price increase linked to the import restrictions.
Domestic producers benefit from the increase in domestic price. The profit variation for foreign producers is always negative despite the price increase, since their sold quantities are strongly reduced. The foreign producers' losses outweigh the domestic welfare increase only for the United States leading to a decrease in international welfare. For the United States, the variations are similar for both cases (and columns), since the large MRL variations lead to the full elimination of foreign imports (with 0 λ = ), which corresponds to a drastic standard. Two remarks can be added to table 3. First, we abstracted from the cost of regulation and inspection linked to the standard. By considering international (or domestic) welfare in table 3, this cost could be subtracted from it for having the net-social benefit of regulation and inspection. 17 Second, under cases 1 and 2, the European Union shows the largest relative variation in international welfare, which ex post explains its appetite for more regulation. Union with a similar interpretation to the one provided in table 3. As the MRL is already low (namely a relatively high standard), reinforcing the standard towards zero tolerance brings a large gain for consumers via the reduction of the cost of ignorance, while the price effect linked to the import restriction following the standard enforcement is relatively low. For Japan, the large adjustment for some foreign producers not complying with pre-existing stringent standards in other countries makes the new standard costly and explains the decline of consumers' surplus, foreign producers' profits and international welfare. For Japan, the variations are similar for both cases (and columns), since the large MRL variations lead to the full elimination of foreign imports (with 0 λ = ), which corresponds to a drastic standard.
Conclusion
Using a very stylized framework, we studied how gravity models can be used for welfare analysis. With our application based on crustacean products, we measured the impact of standards capping chloramphenicol residues. While the econometric estimation of the gravity equation shows a negative impact on imports, welfare evaluations show that, in most cases, a stricter standard leads to an increase in both domestic and international welfare. This is an important result since this analysis of international welfare justifies tightening the food safety standards on imported crustaceans. This application illustrates the danger of treating NTMs as equivalent to tariffs restricting trade. NTM reduction without a clear welfare framework may be groundless and erroneous. Trade reductions and trade costs can be welfare improving in a second best setting, since it alleviates market failures that should be taken into account.
In order to focus on the main economic mechanisms and to keep the mathematical aspects as simple as possible, the analytical framework was admittedly simple. In order to fit different problems coming from various contexts, some extensions could be integrated into the model presented here. For instance, the crustacean species could be refined in the estimations. Taking into account the selection of alternative species less sensitive to residues by producers (such as the Penaeus Vannamei) may lead to a dynamic welfare approach. Data allowing demand and supply elasticities specific to each country could be considered. Eventually, the case where the damage is internalized in the consumers' demand can also be developed.
Our approach suggests that it is especially imperative for governments to examine both gravity and welfare approaches when NTMs are analyzed. First, the gravity estimation helps know whether or not a specific NTM really impacts trade by eliciting a statistically (non)-significant effect. Second, the integration of a statistically significant effect in a calibrated model provides a rigorous welfare measure of the NTM.
These results for estimating welfare variations particularly help assess the impacts of ex ante regulatory measures, that is to say, before the effective implementation of food, environmental or health policies. The gravity and experimentation/survey results are a basis for anticipating market reactions and they help anticipate the regulatory adjustments on markets and achieve quantified analyses directly usable by the public decision-maker or by the World Trade
Organization when there is a conflict over NTMs. This methodology combining gravity and welfare approaches may be systematically mobilized for cost-benefit analyses enlightening the decision-makers on the consequences of various public choices. (2008) also control for the unobserved firm-level heterogeneity bias that results from the variation in the fraction of firms that export from a source to a destination country. Their definition of the extensive margin (cf. infra) is therefore a bit different since it includes a change in the share of exporting firms.
5 A more accurate econometric estimation would be to add importer and exporter fixed effects interacted with the NTM variable in equation (2).
6 It is also possible to consider the case with I taking a value between 0 and 1, namely for situations where consumers are partially aware of the characteristic. 7 The proportion of goods entering the domestic market also represents the combination of producer's probabilities of being fully excluded from the domestic market when a small producer is detected with contaminated products.
8 Alternatively, the standard could equally influence foreign and domestic producers leading to an alternative
, replacing equation (6).
9 Crustacean products include a large proportion of shrimps relatively to other crustaceans.
10 Concerns are also related to the environment (destruction of mangroves) and social costs (corruption of authorities, employment of children and of illegal immigrants). However, we will not address these concerns in the article.
12 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm (available May 2009). 13 In the European Union, the MRL is defined at the European level and applied by all Member States.
14 Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) also use regulation costs and common religion as excluded variables.
However, such data are not available for all countries included in our sample. To avoid a substantial drop in sample size, we do not use these variables as excluded ones in our estimations. 15 The proportion λ coming from (6) and welfare shifts of tables 3 and 4 were computed with the Mathematica software and are available upon request. 16 This case is such that
17 The inspections and regulatory costs can be borne by consumers, domestic producers, taxpayers and/or foreign producers depending on the selected fee (per-unit fee or fixed fee) that finances the inspection policy (see Crespi and Marette 2001) . 18 This situation with a MRL=0 does not correspond to a strict zero tolerance policy because of flaws in the test procedures and the impossibility of testing all the products. Note: Fixed effects not reported. Standard errors (country-pair clustered) in parentheses with ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Common language is the excluded variable. Own-price elasticity of supply 
